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A POX ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES: WHY THE COURT CAN’T FIX
THE ERIE DOCTRINE
Suzanna Sherry*

As Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 celebrates its 75th anniversary, it
is becoming more apparent that it is on a collision course with itself. The
Court keeps trying – and failing – to sort out the tensions within the Erie
doctrine and between it and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court’s latest Erie decision, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate
Ins. Co.,2 was yet another attempt to separate substance from procedure and
navigate the strait between the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules
Enabling Act. It was a disaster. It produced two distinct methodological
approaches, three opinions – none commanding a majority – and a rash of
academic commentary choosing sides between the two approaches. What it
did not produce, unfortunately, is any recognition that the source of the
problem is the internal incoherence of the Erie doctrine itself and its
profound incompatibility with the guiding principles of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In this essay, I identify the problem and suggest a solution.
Shady Grove brings to the forefront two key questions that the Court
has failed to confront, one technical and doctrinal and the other more
broadly jurisprudential. The doctrinal question is how a court in a diversity
case should treat a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that in general has no
effect on substantive rights but that affects substantive rights in particular
states or particular types of cases. Shady Grove itself is an example of this
type of Rule – Rule 23 has no significant substantive effect in most states or
most cases, but does so in cases seeking statutory damages under New York
law – but the same problem also underlies other recent Erie cases. Courts
have three real options in this situation: The Federal Rule governs
regardless of its effect on state substantive rights, the Federal Rule governs
*
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unless it has a demonstrable effect on state substantive rights, or the Federal
Rule governs only when it has no imaginable effect on state substantive
rights. Choosing among those three options requires a normative
justification. That justification, in turn, depends on whether we place a
greater value on the uniformity and transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, or on states’ ultimate authority to define substantive
rights.
My suggestion is that instead of filtering that normative choice
through the convoluted and self-contradictory Erie doctrine, we confront it
directly. Courts make exactly this value choice in other, similar contexts –
including certain choice-of-law decisions, the dormant commerce clause
doctrine, the application of federal common law in limited “enclaves,” and
the determination of whether state law should be preempted on the ground
that it serves as an obstacle to the fulfillment of the purpose of a federal
statute. Courts confronting a possible conflict between federal and state law
in the Erie context should use the same overarching framework that governs
those situations.
That framework, like Erie itself, ultimately raises the deeper
jurisprudential question: Under what circumstances is lawmaking by the
federal judiciary justified? I contend that we should give the same answer in
the Erie context that we do in these other contexts: whenever federal
interests are sufficiently important to warrant judicial protection.
Framing the question as one of judicial authority reveals that a large
part of the problem with Erie is that it, contrary to these other cognate
doctrines, depends on two false dichotomies (which my proposal
eliminates). First, by allowing the federal legislature but not the federal
judiciary to determine that federal interests justify overriding state
substantive law, Erie draws an unwarranted distinction between federal
legislative power and federal judicial power. Second, by allowing some
“enclaves” of federal common law to remain, the Erie doctrine draws an
unspoken and unjustified distinction between those federal interests that
require legislative codification before the judiciary can act and those federal
interests that can be protected by the judiciary without prior legislative
authorization.
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Reframing the Erie inquiry as asking whether protecting the
transsubstantivity and uniformity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
a sufficiently important interest to justify overriding state substantive law
makes Erie both internally coherent and consistent with kindred doctrines.
It also solves the Shady Grove puzzle. And, as I note briefly at the end of
this essay, it has broader implications for cases arising out of our
nationalized consumer economy.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The difficulty stems from the underlying goals of the Erie doctrine.
According to Justice Brandeis’ majority opinion, the decision in Erie was
necessary because of two major problems with Swift v. Tyson:3 Swift led to
unfair differences in the treatment of similarly situated litigants4 and it
transgressed the state’s primary authority by allowing the federal judiciary
to “invad[e] rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the several
states.”5 Two decades later, the Court reaffirmed these purposes of Erie,
although without the constitutional gloss, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc.6 The Byrd Court described the core of Erie as a
command that “the federal courts in diversity cases must respect the
definition of state-created rights and obligations” and thus must apply state
law if that law is “bound up with [state] rights and obligations.”7 In
addition, according to Byrd, the Erie doctrine “evince[s] a broader policy”
that federal courts should follow all state rules – even procedural ones not
bound up with rights and obligations – if “the litigation would come out one
way in the federal court and another way in the state court if the federal
court failed to apply” state law.8 These policies are the same as the two
3

41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1842).
304 U.S. at 74.
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Id. at 80. The Court also reinterpreted the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2006). For critiques of this decidedly creative act of statutory interpretation, see Suzanna
Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39
Pepperdine L. Rev. 129, 133-37 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, Federalized America:
Reflections on Erie and State-Based Regulation, ___ Geo. Mason L. Rev. ___ (2013).
6
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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Id. at 535.
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identified by Erie, in reverse order. Then in the seminal case of Hanna v.
Plumer,9 the Court again reiterated one of the policies, noting that Erie was
rooted in “a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a
litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in federal
court.”10
One goal underlies both of these frequently invoked policies, and
forms the core purpose of and justification for the Erie doctrine. This key
unitary goal is that our dual court systems should not result in disparate
regulation of what Justice Harlan later called “primary decisions respecting
human conduct.”11 The consequences of behavior that takes place outside
the courtroom should not vary as a result of which seal adorns the
courthouse door.
But the Erie doctrine is, and has to be, more nuanced than the
mechanical implementation of this goal, because we do have dual court
systems. And so accommodating differences between those systems –
drawing lines between what happens inside the courtroom and what
happens outside it – is a necessary part of the doctrine. As the Court found
to its detriment early in the application and development of Erie, we cannot
blithely assert that any state rule that affects the outcome in a diversity case
must be applied notwithstanding contrary federal rules. Every difference
between state and federal rules, however minor or “procedural,” has the
potential to affect the outcome of litigation. To direct that in every such
case the state rule controls is to ignore the reality of dual court systems with
different legislative bodies exercising control over their procedures. And
Congress has exercised its control over federal court procedures by
been explicitly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, and is probably limited to Byrd itself. See
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the
Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence? 73 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 963, 998-99 (1998).The status of the balancing test, however, is entirely
distinct from the two goals identified in text, which are uncontroversial.
9
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
10
Id. at 467. The Court also focused on the need to prevent forum-shopping, but for
purposes of identifying the goals underlying Erie, there is little or no difference between
unfairness and forum-shopping. The Hanna Court did not mention the policy of protecting
state authority, perhaps because by 1965 the constitutional basis for Erie had been
discredited. There is nothing in Hanna to indicate abandonment of the basic concept of
keeping state and federal authority within proper bounds.
11
Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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adopting the Rules Enabling Act.12 The REA authorized the creation of
uniform rules of procedure for federal courts, which, in a well-recognized
irony, took effect the same year as Erie.
The Rules Enabling Act thus requires courts to adapt the Erie
doctrine by taking into account the existence of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. And I contend that this accommodation, whatever form it takes,
is a part of the Erie doctrine – pace John Ely13 – because it stems from the
same sources and serves the same goals as Erie itself. In determining
whether a state rule (of any kind) or a Federal Rule (of Civil Procedure)
governs, we are necessarily specifying exactly how far the Erie doctrine
extends. At its broadest, the Erie doctrine might command that a Federal
Rule give way any time its application would result in a different outcome
than the one that a state court, applying state rules of procedure, would
reach. At its narrowest, Erie’s command to use state law might be fully
trumped by any applicable Federal Rule, despite its effect on state policies
or litigation outcomes. But in either case – and all the cases in between – it
is the Erie doctrine that we are delineating. As Richard Freer noted more
than two decades ago, the Erie doctrine “is actually comprised of two
separate principles of vertical choice of law,” one embodied in the Rules
Enabling Act and the other in the Rules of Decision Act.14
Navigating the boundaries of Erie has not proven easy. Over the
years, the Court has suggested several different approaches to
accommodating the commands of Erie in the context of the Federal Rules.
In a spate of cases in the 1940s, the Court appeared to adopt an extremely
broad reading of Erie, refusing to apply the Rules in diversity cases if they
12

28 U.S.C. § 2072.
See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 697-98 (1974)
(suggesting that the validity and applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure does not
implicate either Erie or the Rules of Decision Act). But see Abram Chayes, The Bead
Game, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 752 (1974) (“not even the most luminous analytic framework
relieves us of the necessity of discerning the state and federal policies at stake in cases
involving a choice between state and federal law, whether the case arises under the Rules
of Decision Act or the Enabling Act”)
14
Richard D. Freer, Erie’s Mid-Life Crisis, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1087, 1089 (1989). He adds:
“Together, these principles are intended to protect state sovereignty by ensuring that a
federal court enforcing state claims acts substantively as a court of the state would act. At
the same time, these principles also recognize the legitimate need of the federal courts, as a
separate judicial system, to dictate their own procedures.” Id. at 1090.
13
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produced a litigation outcome different from the outcome a state court
would have reached.15 Almost simultaneously, however, the Court in
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.16 upheld a district court order under Rule 35 –
requiring a plaintiff to undergo a physical examination – in a diversity case
in which it was quite likely that a state court would have lacked authority to
issue such an order. Without even mentioning Erie (then only three years
old), the Court found that Rule 35 “really regulates procedure” and thus had
to be applied.17 Sibbach might be viewed as representing a very narrow
reading of Erie, the polar opposite of the 1940s cases.
These early cases reflect significant confusion about the breadth of
Erie and its relationship to the Federal Rules. The Court tried to sort out the
confusion in Hanna v. Plumer.18 Hanna reconciled the conflicting lines of
precedent by arranging them along a new axis. The Court distinguished
situations “covered by one of the Federal Rules”19 (like Sibbach) from those
in which there is no governing Federal Rule (like the 1940s cases). In the
former, the Sibbach test applies, and a federal court should follow the
Federal Rule unless it does not really regulate procedure. To do otherwise,
the Court suggested, would “disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of
power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in
the Enabling Act.”20 In other words, Erie’s contours and scope are limited
by the existence of the federal power to adopt rules of procedure for federal
courts. But in the absence of a Federal Rule – which the Court called “the
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice”21 – the Hanna Court adopted a
modified “outcome-determinative” test: A federal court should follow the
state rule if applying federal law would run afoul of the “twin aims” of Erie:
“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws.”22 As Ely pointed out, the Hanna Court thus

15

Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 236 U.S. 99 (1945); Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
16
312 U.S. 1 (1941)
17
Id. at 14.
18
380 U.S. 460 (1965)
19
Id. at 471.
20
Id. at 473-74.
21
Id. at 471.
22
Id. at 468.
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protected state prerogatives more vigorously in the absence of a Federal
Rule than in the presence of one.23
This solution may reconcile the precedents, but it does not solve the
underlying problem. The Erie doctrine tells us that federal courts sitting in
diversity must respect state policy choices on matters of substance, to avoid
both unfairness and the aggrandizement of federal court authority. But the
doctrine also tells us – in Sibbach and reaffirmed in Hanna – that federal
courts sitting in diversity must apply all valid Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. What should we do when the application of an otherwise valid
Federal Rule runs afoul of a state policy choice on a matter of substance?
Commentators have recognized a form of this dilemma, but have
wrongly attributed it to the Court’s failure to give any meaning to the
second section of the Rules Enabling Act, which prohibits federal
rulemakers from adopting procedural rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right.”24 According to many scholars, the problem is that
the Court has wrongly ignored the possibility that a “procedural” Federal
Rule might nevertheless impair substantive rights and therefore be invalid
as beyond the rulemakers’ authority.25
But framing the question as one of the validity of the Federal Rule
under the REA (as Sibbach did) hides the real Erie issue: Application of a
Federal Rule might impair substantive rights in one state but not in another
or in one type of case but not another. And it is the Erie doctrine, not the
REA, that controls the decision whether a particular state rule prevails over
a conflicting federal one. The REA is all or nothing; if a Federal Rule is
invalid, it is invalid in all cases – including not only in diversity cases in
which there is no conflicting state law but also in federal question cases. Or,
as Kevin Clermont puts it so nicely, a rule that is valid under the REA is

23

Ely, supra note ___, at 720-22.
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
25
Ely, supra note ___, at 718-20. See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015 (1982); Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (In
the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 47 (1998); Martin Redish
& Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A
Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 26 (2008).
24
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“immune to any ‘as-applied’ challenge.”26 Erie, however, is quite explicitly
tailored to protecting the substantive law and policies of individual states,
and thus allows federal law to operate in some states but not others.
As an example, consider a situation that has been before the
Supreme Court twice. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 states that “[a] civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” State law in
Kansas and Oklahoma (and some but not all other states) provides that the
statute of limitations is tolled only when the defendant is served, not when
the complaint is filed. If we conclude – as the Court did in two cases 30
years apart27 – that the service requirement is bound up with, or an integral
part of, state substantive law, then Erie seems to prohibit a federal court
from concluding that the statute of limitations is tolled by filing, regardless
of what Rule 3 says. But that does not mean that Rule 3 is invalid under the
REA or that it cannot be applied to toll the statute of limitations in federalquestion cases or in diversity cases applying the law of states that do not
have a law like the ones in Kansas and Oklahoma. (I will return later to how
the Court managed to avoid confronting that issue in these cases.) The
applicability of Rule 3 in any particular diversity case is an Erie question,
not an REA question.
Thus we must face the question of what to do when the application
of a truly procedural Federal Rule, valid under the REA, nevertheless
impairs substantive state rights.28 The two halves of the Erie doctrine –
protecting state substantive policies and accommodating dual court systems
– collide in such a case. And there is precedential support on both sides:
Sibbach suggests that the Federal Rule should prevail, and Byrd suggests
26

Kevin Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 987,
1017 (2011); see also Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity,
and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1181
(2011).
27
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
28
Commentary prior to Shady Grove addressed this question from a different angle,
missing the problem that I seek to identify. In defining what counts as affecting substantive
rights, one might take any of three approaches: nothing procedural counts, anything that
has any effect on a substantive right counts, or anything that has more than an incidental
effect on a substantive right counts. See Redish & Murashko, supra note ___. My concern
is not about the scope of the effect, but rather about what should happen if the requisite
effect is found.
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that state law should prevail. This tension within the Erie doctrine is
exacerbated when we try to harmonize Erie with the goals underlying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One primary guiding principle of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is transsubstantivity: The Rules should
apply uniformly in all cases in federal court. This principle is in obvious
tension with the half of Erie that prohibits applying a Federal Rule if, and
only if, it impairs state rights and obligations.
Shady Grove squarely raised the question whether to apply a Federal
Rule that impairs state substantive rights in some states but not others. As
the next section elaborates, four Justices explicitly followed Sibbach and
five implicitly followed Byrd – although one of the Byrd Justices concluded
that there was no impairment of state substantive rights and thus joined the
four Sibbach Justices to direct application of the Federal Rule.
Unfortunately, none of the Justices confronted the incompatibility between
the two parts of the Erie doctrine.
II. TWO PATHS THROUGH SHADY GROVE
The facts of Shady Grove are mundane, although the implications
are anything but. Shady Grove tendered a claim for insurance benefits to
Allstate, which eventually paid the claim but not within the 30 days
required by a New York state statute. Allstate also refused to pay the
statutorily required interest of 2% per month on the late payment. Alleging
that Allstate routinely paid claims late without paying the statutory interest,
Shady Grove filed a class action in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction. The minimum jurisdictional amount was satisfied only if the
suit could be maintained as a class action, because the actual interest due to
Shady Grove alone was less than $500.29
Although the suit apparently met all the requirements of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23 for a class action, the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
because it found that under New York law the suit could not be maintained

29

The total amount in controversy for the whole class, however, was more than $5 million,
and thus there was federal jurisdiction over the class action (but not the individual actions)
under the Class Action Fairness Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
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as a class action.30 New York Civil Practice Law § 901(b) prohibits class
actions “to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery, created or
imposed by statute,”31 which, the district court found, included the statutory
interest provision at issue. The court of appeals affirmed,32 and the Supreme
Court had to decide whether Rule 23 or § 901(b) governed.
Eight of the Justices approached the issue as a technical question of
interpretation of the Federal Rules. The case lent itself to that approach
because of the way the Court had avoided the internal Erie tensions in prior
precedent. In Walker v. Armco Steel Co.,33 one of the Rule 3 cases described
earlier, the Court had sidestepped the question of what to do when a Federal
Rule impairs state substantive rights. It did so by interpreting Rule 3 as not
intended to toll a statute of limitations but rather to set the date from which
timing requirements within the Federal Rules run. The Federal Rule was
therefore irrelevant to the tolling question, and did not apply. Walker
directed that the Rules should be interpreted according to their “plain
meaning”34 and should apply only if they are “sufficiently broad to control
the issue”35 – that is, if there is a “direct collision” between the Federal Rule
and a state rule.36
Under Walker, then, the fate of Shady Grove’s class action hung on
whether there was a direct collision between Rule 23 and § 901(b). If so,
then under Sibbach and Hanna Rule 23 governed unless it was itself invalid
as beyond Congress’s power to regulate. If not, then § 901(b) governed
under Hanna’s modified “outcome-determinative” test, for surely a case
that could be brought as a class action in federal court but not in state court
would create inequities and induce forum-shopping.37
30

466 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 901(b) (2006).
32
549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008).
33
446 U.S. 740 (1980). The earlier of the two cases, Ragan, was one of those decided in
the 1940s when the Court seemed unsure of how to accommodate the Federal Rules; it
simply held that because the suit would have been barred in a Kansas court, it could not be
brought in a federal court.
34
446 U.S. at 750 n.9 (1980).
35
Id. at 749.
36
Id.
37
It seems problematic to have to resort to Hanna’s outcome-determinative test once the
Court has concluded that the Federal Rule does not apply: After all, if there is no applicable
31
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Four Justices took a mechanical and formalist approach to
interpreting Rule 23. Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality that included
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and (for part of the opinion) Justice
Sotomayor, placed the two rules side by side and concluded that there was a
direct conflict between them. Rule 23 states that a class action “may be
maintained” but § 901(b) says that a class action may not be maintained.
Hence, under Hanna’s reading of Sibbach, Rule 23 trumps § 901(b) unless
Rule 23 is itself invalid. And since (unsurprisingly) no Justice was willing
to hold Rule 23 invalid, the plurality held that the suit could be maintained
as a class action, New York state law notwithstanding.
Four Justices adopted a more functionalist approach to interpreting
Rule 23. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in an opinion joined by Justices
Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, argued that Rule 23’s potential to “transform a
$500 case into a $5,000,000 award”38 required the Court to interpret Rule
23 more narrowly to prevent “trench[ing] on state policy prerogatives.”39
She – like the courts below – argued that while Rule 23 governs the
considerations relevant to class certification, New York’s § 901(b) instead
governs the availability of a particular remedy. As she pointed out, § 901(b)
would not be an obstacle to a class action in a New York state court if the
only remedy sought were actual damages or an injunction; New York law
bars class actions only in suits to recover statutory penalties. Because there
was no conflict between state and federal law, both could be given their
intended scope. Hence, under Hanna’s reading of Erie, state law should
govern because there was no conflicting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
and applying state law would prevent inequities and forum-shopping.
Is this just a simple difference of interpretive opinion? No, as Justice
Stevens’ separate opinion (concurring in the judgment only) makes clear.
Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality that Rule 23 conflicts with §
901(b). And he ultimately agreed that Rule 23 should prevail. But he did so
Federal Rule, the only source of law is state. But the Court in Walker did invoke the “twin
aims” of Erie to conclude that state law should apply, even though it had already concluded
that the Federal Rule was not broad enough to reach the question. That, however, is the
least of Walker’s problems.
38
130 S. Ct. at 1460 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.).
39
Id. at 1461.
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only after concluding that the New York legislature did not intend § 901(b)
as a substantive rule. In other words, he followed (without citing or
quoting40) the Byrd suggestion that Erie commands the use of any state law,
however procedural it may appear, if it is “bound up with [the] rights and
obligations” of the parties. The dissent’s approach is just a version of this
same Byrd analysis. While Justice Stevens (like Byrd itself) makes the
character of the state law an independent inquiry, the dissenting Justices
fold it into the interpretation of Rule 23. Either way, if the state legislature
intended the state rule to operate substantively rather than procedurally, the
Federal Rule must give way.
In the end, then, the opinions in Shady Grove break down into two
opposite approaches to this basic Erie dilemma. One – that of the plurality –
makes the character of the state law irrelevant; the only question is whether
the federal Rule is procedural. As the plurality put it: “[I]t is not the
substantive or procedural nature of the state law that matters, but the
substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule.”41 The other – that of
both the concurrence and the dissent – makes the character of the state law
dispositive: Justice Stevens “agree[d] with Justice Ginsburg that there are
some state procedural rules that federal courts must apply in diversity cases
because they function as a part of the State’s definition of substantive rights
and remedies.”42
The varying approaches in Shady Grove thus expose the real
problem with the Erie doctrine’s command, made most explicit in Hanna,
to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but avoid impairing state
substantive rights and obligations. Whenever a doctrine or statute has dual
rationales, of course, the possibility exists that a case will arise pitting one
rationale against the other. Shady Grove is that case, and the three opinions
in the case perfectly illustrate the three responses to such a dilemma:
Privilege one rationale, privilege the other rationale, or pretend that the
rationales can be harmonized. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, by applying
40

He did quote Byrd once, for the platitude that federal courts sitting in diversity operate as
“an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its
jurisdiction.” 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
41
Id. at 1444 (opinion of Scalia, J.)
42
Id. at 1448 (opinion of Stevens, J.)
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Sibbach despite acknowledging its imperfections in cases that implicate
state policy choices, opts for the transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules.
Justice Stevens favors state policy choices, even though doing so might
mean that Rule 23 applies differently in different states or different causes
of action.43 And the dissenters try to have it both ways, by interpreting Rule
23 in light of state policy choices – but that is a false alternative, because it
means that Rule 23 would be interpreted differently in a diversity case
applying New York law than in a diversity case applying the law of a state
that had not adopted the policies underlying § 901(b). Academic
commentators on Shady Grove can likewise be divided into those who think
Justice Scalia got it right, those who think Justice Stevens got it right, and
those who try to make the problem go away.44
The underlying issue, therefore, is not merely a question of
interpreting Federal Rules or separating substance from procedure. The real
question is what should be done when a federal procedural rule conflicts
with a state substantive rule (however we ultimately define “procedural”
and “substantive”). Unfortunately, the Erie doctrine itself provides
conflicting answers. Both of the approaches in Shady Grove are fully
supported by Erie and its progeny. And the tension between them is
inherent in the Erie doctrine; it cannot be resolved as long as that doctrine
43

Because he ultimately concluded that New York’s § 901(b) does not represent a
substantive policy choice, he did not have to live with the uniformity-undermining
consequences of his approach. Nevertheless, his opinion indicates quite strongly that he
would be willing to do so.
44
Those supporting Justice Scalia’s plurality approach include Jennifer S. Hendricks, In
Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 103 (2011); Richard
A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1069 (2011); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential
Democracy-Enhancing Benefits of Erie Formalism, 44 Akron L. Rev. 907 (2011). Those
supporting Justice Stevens’ concurring approach include Allan Ides, The Standard for
Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate
Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1041 (2011); Struve, supra
note ___. Those supporting Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting approach include Joseph P.
Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine from A
Conflicts Perspective, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 939 (2011); Heather Gerken, Foreword:
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 320-30 (2010); Kermit Roosevelt III,
Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 52 (2012). See also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17 (2010)
(criticizing the Court generally).
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remains established law. The next section shows that while Shady Grove
may be the most recent – and perhaps the clearest – example of this
unresolvable tension, it has manifested itself in many of the Court’s recent
Erie cases.45 And, as in Shady Grove, different Justices have had different
responses to the conflict, and, moreover, some Justices have used different
and inconsistent approaches in different cases.
III. A RECURRENT PROBLEM
As several commentators have noted, Shady Grove was in many
ways a replay of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.46 but with the
opposite side prevailing. In Gasperini, the Court was faced with a conflict
between state and federal standards for review of an allegedly excessive
jury verdict. A New York statute instructed courts of appeals to overturn an
award if it “deviate[d] materially” from reasonable compensation.47 Federal
courts, by contrast, adhered to the common-law rule that a jury’s verdict
should stand unless it was so unreasonable that it “shock[ed] the
conscience.”48 Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, taking the same
“split the baby” approach as in her Shady Grove dissent. After concluding
that Federal Rule 59 – governing the grant of a new trial – did not mandate
the adoption of a “shocks the conscience” test, and that the New York
statute represented a substantive policy choice, she held that both the state
and federal interests could be accommodated by having federal trial courts
(rather than appellate courts, as the New York statute dictated) apply the
45

The same issue also arises frequently in lower courts. For example, one current dispute is
how to apply the relatively relaxed pleading standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and the minimal
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 to cases in which the applicable state law requires that
malpractice complaints be accompanied by an affidavit or certificate attesting that the
claim has merit. Compare, e.g., Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258 (3d
Cir. 2011) with, e.g., Braddock v. Orlando Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 580
(M.D. Fla. 1995). One scholar has also suggested that “procedure is embedded in
substantive law” insofar as the drafters of the law assumed particular procedures when
calibrating the law to the desired level of deterrence. Thomas O. Main, The Procedural
Foundations of Substantive Law, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 801, 802 (2010). If he is correct,
then virtually every diversity case raises the Shady Grove issue.
46
518 U.S. 415 (1996). See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie
and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1131, 1146-47
(2011).
47
N.Y. CPLR 5501(c).
48
See 518 U.S. at 422 (describing the federal standard).
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“deviates materially standard.” Justice Scalia’s vehement dissent instead
interpreted Rule 59 as incorporating the “shocks the conscience” standard
and insisted that under Hanna Rule 59 must prevail even over a contrary
state policy decision on substantive rights.49 As in Shady Grove, then,
Justice Scalia chose federal-court uniformity over the state’s substantive
policy choice, and Justice Ginsburg preferred to pretend that
accommodating state choices was not in conflict with the Federal Rules or
with transsubstantivity.50
Gasperini thus provides an example of the Justices disagreeing
about how to resolve the Erie dilemma. But in Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp,51 the Rule 3 case already discussed, a unanimous Court was
seemingly unaware of the problem. Recall that under Rule 3 “[a] civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”52 In Walker, the
plaintiff had filed but not served the complaint in a diversity suit before the
statute of limitations expired; state law required service of the complaint in
order to toll the statute. The Court, purportedly interpreting Rule 3
according to its “plain meaning,” held that Rule 3 had nothing to say about
tolling the statute of limitations and thus that it was not in conflict with the
state law: “Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements
49

He also argued that the Seventh Amendment precluded the use of the “deviates
materially” standard and that the Court misapplied even the “unguided” Erie prong in
finding the difference between the two standards to be substantive.
50
The different results in the two cases were not due to any Justice changing his or her
mind, but rather to a change in personnel. Justice Stevens dissented in Gasperini on
technical grounds, but noted that he “agree[d] with most of the reasoning in the Court's
opinion.” 518 U.S. at 439. As noted earlier, he similarly agreed with the reasoning, but not
the result, of the dissenters in Shady Grove. His vote made no difference in Gasperini
because there were five votes without him, but in Shady Grove his vote was the deciding
one because Justice Ginsburg had lost an ally. Justices Kennedy and Breyer voted
consistently with Justice Ginsburg for state policy choices, Justice Thomas voted
consistently with Justice Scalia for the Federal Rules, and Chief Justice Roberts replaced
Chief Justice Rehnquist as an additional vote for the Federal Rules. But although Justices
O’Connor and Souter both voted with Justice Ginsburg in Gasperini, their successors split,
with Justice Alito joining Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shady Grove and Justice Sotomayor
joining most of the majority opinion (although not the portion directly taking issue with
Justice Stevens’s concurrence). Because Justice Sotomayor appears not to have taken a
strong position, and Justice Kagan has replaced Justice Stevens, it is impossible to predict
where the Court will go in the future. The only certainty is that the Court will face this
question again, and it will implicate the same conflicting rationales.
51
446 U.S. 740 (1980).
52
Fed. R. Civ. P. 3.
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of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of
limitations.”53 A few years later, however, in West v. Conrail,54 the Court
interpreted Rule 3 in a federal-question case and held that filing does toll
the statute of limitations. Ironically, Justice Stevens’ unanimous opinion in
West distinguished Walker in a footnote: “Respect for the State's
substantive decision that actual service is a component of the policies
underlying the statute of limitations requires that the service rule in a
diversity suit ‘be considered part and parcel of the statute of limitations.’ . .
. This requirement, naturally, does not apply to federal-question cases.”55
Having first interpreted Rule 3 in Walker supposedly without regard to state
policies (ignoring the problem), the Court then offhandedly and unselfconsciously adopted what has now become the hotly-contested position that
Rules should apply differently – or at least be interpreted differently –
depending on whether state substantive policies are at stake.
In Burlington Northern RR v. Woods,56 by contrast – decided
between Walker and West – a unanimous Court took exactly the opposite
approach. It ignored the problem by applying Hanna without any discussion
of the possible substantive nature of the state law. Burlington Northern
presented a conflict between Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which
makes the award of costs and damages for a frivolous appeal discretionary,
and an Alabama statute that made such an award mandatory for
unsuccessful appeals in particular circumstances. The Court concluded that
the Federal Rule could “reasonably be classified as procedural,” and thus
that under Hanna it displaced the Alabama statute.57 There was no
discussion of the purposes behind the state statute or whether it might be a
“component” of, for example, substantive state tort-reform policies.58
Although Walker, West, and Burlington Northern were all
unanimous – but not consistent with one another – dissension arose a year
53

446 U.S. at 751.
481 U.S. 35 (1987).
55
Id. at 39 n.4.
56
480 U.S. 1 (1987).
57
Id. at 8.
58
Contrast this absence of discussion to the majority opinion in Gasperini, which carefully
noted that the New York statute “invit[ing] more careful appellate scrutiny” of damage
awards was “part of a series of tort reform measures.” 518 U.S. at 423.
54
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after Burlington Northern, as the Court began to fracture along the line
between federal uniformity and state substantive policy. Surprisingly,
however, it was Justice Scalia who urged attention to state policies. Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.59 involved a clash between a federal
court’s discretionary power to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and
an Alabama statute that prohibited the enforcement of contractual forumselection clauses. The majority viewed the case as a straightforward Hanna
issue, concluding that because the two laws directly conflicted and §
1404(a) was within Congress’s power to enact, federal law governed.
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing (in language later quoted by the dissent in
Shady Grove) that “in deciding whether a federal procedural statute or Rule
of Procedure encompasses a particular issue, a broad reading that would
create significant disuniformity between state and federal courts should be
avoided if the text permits.”60 The majority responded to this argument
much as Justice Scalia himself eventually did in Shady Grove: “Not the
least of the problems with the dissent's analysis is that it makes the
applicability of a federal statute depend on the content of state law.”61
In another recent situation, the Court avoided the problem by
recharacterizing the issue as not about the Erie doctrine at all. At the same
time, its reasoning highlighted and further confused the core problems of
Erie. In Semktek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,62 a California
federal court sitting in diversity dismissed Semtek’s California state-law
claims with prejudice on statute-of-limitations grounds. Semtek refiled the
claims in a Maryland state court under Maryland law; Maryland had a
longer statute of limitations. The question before the Supreme Court was
whether the federal-court dismissal was claim-preclusive, barring the
59

487 U.S. 22 (1988)
Id. at 37-38 (citing Walker but not Burlington Northern) (Scalia, J., dissenting); quoted
in Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
61
Id. at 31 n.10 (majority opinion). Compare Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 (opinion of
Scalia, J.) (“The dissent’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules conflict
based on the subjective intentions of the state legislature . . . would mean . . . that one
State’s statute could survive preemption (and accordingly affect the procedures in federal
court) while another State’s identical law would not”); 1440 n.6 (opinion of Scalia, J.)
(“nothing in our decision [in Walker] suggested that a federal court may resolve an obvious
conflict between the texts of state and federal rules by resorting to the law’s ostensible
objectives”).
62
531 U.S. 497 (2001).
60
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Maryland suit. After concluding that neither precedent nor Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b) answered the question, the Court held that the
preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is governed by federal
common law but that in diversity cases the content of federal preclusion law
is the law that would be applied in state court.
Semtek is a minefield under Erie, and Justice Scalia’s unanimous
opinion tiptoed across it bobbing and weaving to avoid disaster. Erie itself
made several cameo appearances, each one creating more questions than
answers.
To begin with, the Semtek Court suggested that to interpret Rule
41(b) as directing that all dismissals “on the merits” be accorded claimpreclusive effect – regardless of whether state law would give such
dismissals preclusive effect – would “arguably” violate both the Rules
Enabling Act and Erie by modifying substantive rights and encouraging
forum-shopping.64 This is exactly the kind of state-sensitive interpretation
of the Federal Rules that the Court adopted in Walker and that the dissent
urged in Shady Grove. The citation to the REA in Semtek might distinguish
Walker and Shady Grove and resolve the tension between following state
substantive policies and applying the Federal Rules transsubstantively; the
Court seems to be suggesting that Rule 41(b) can never be interpreted to
equate “on the merits” with claim-preclusion. But in an odd footnote,
Justice Scalia acknowledged the possibility that Rule 41(b) might be
interpreted differently in different situations:
63

Rule 41(b), interpreted as a preclusion-establishing rule, would not
have the two effects described in the preceding paragraphs –
arguable violation of the Rules Enabling Act and incompatibility
with Erie – if the court’s failure to specify an other-than-on-themerits dismissal were subject to reversal on appeal whenever it
would alter the rule of claim preclusion applied in the State in which
63

Rule 41(b), governing involuntary dismissals, provides in relevant part that any nonvoluntary dismissal (with three exceptions not relevant to the case) “operates as an
adjudication on the merits” “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b).
64
531 U.S. at 503-04.
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the federal court sits. No one suggests that this is the rule, and we
are aware of no case that applies it.65
In other words, although one might interpret Rule 41(b) as preclusiondeterminative only when doing so did not impair state rights, that
interpretation is not plausible under the caselaw. But both the plurality in
Shady Grove and the majority in Stewart rejected the possibility of
differential application of the Federal Rules as a matter of principle, not
precedent.66 That is a far cry from the unadorned suggestion, in the Semtek
footnote just quoted, that differential application is not supported by
precedent. So Semtek ultimately leaves the dilemma unresolved: Maybe
Erie and the Rules Enabling Act work together to invalidate any
interpretation of any Federal Rule that might possibly impair substantive
rights in any state, or maybe they are still at cross-purposes insofar as Erie
commands interpreting or applying the Rules in light of particular state law.
Even more peculiar is the Court’s treatment of the ultimate question
in Semtek: the source of law governing the preclusive effect of a federalcourt diversity judgment. At first glance, this seems like a straightforward
Erie question. Because there is no federal Rule or statute on point, the Court
should apply Erie (as articulated in the portion of Hanna dealing with the
“unguided” Erie choice) and ask whether applying federal common-law
preclusion doctrines, rather than state law, would create inequities or
encourage forum-shopping.
But the Court did not take that route. It instead held that federal
common law always governs the preclusive effect of a federal court
judgment, but that in diversity cases the content of federal common law
should ordinarily mirror that of the state in which the diversity court sits:
“This is, it seems to us, a classic case for adopting, as the federally
prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in
the State in which the federal diversity court sits.”67 At the same time,
65

Id. at 504 n.1 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
See TAN at ___.
67
531 U.S. at 508. Not the least of the peculiarities of this holding is that it seems to ignore
the teaching of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manuf. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) by applying
the preclusion law of the state in which the court sits rather than the preclusion law that that
state would choose to apply. That oddity, however, is not relevant to my thesis.
66
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however, the Court supported this conclusion by citing Gasperini, Walker,
and other Erie cases. It also went on to suggest that “any other rule would
produce the sort of ‘forum-shopping . . . and . . . inequitable administration
of the laws’ that Erie seeks to avoid . . . .”68
In Semtek, then, the Court used the principles underlying the Erie
doctrine to require application of state preclusion law, but explicitly denied
that Erie and its progeny were dispositive. One benefit of this approach
becomes apparent when the reader gets to the next paragraph of the opinion.
The Court noted there that “[t]his federal reference to state law will not
obtain, of course, in situations in which the state law is incompatible with
federal interests.”69 Absent resurrection of the Byrd balancing test – which
no Justice seems to favor – this preference for federal interests could not be
accomplished under the Erie doctrine.70 Holding Erie obliquely rather than
directly relevant allows the Court an escape from state substantive policies
of which it does not approve.71
The Court thus avoided the central dilemma of Erie – what to do
when a state’s substantive policy decisions clash with application of an
arguably procedural federal rule72 – by not applying Erie at all. There is no
need for the interpretive contortions of a case like Walker: In federal68

531 U.S. at 508-09.
Id. at 509.
70
Patrick Woolley has recognized the linkage between Byrd and Semtek (and considers
Gasperini to be similar). He contends that all three cases illustrate a required balancing
between two interests: “(1) the federal interest in avoiding differences in outcome (the Erie
policy), against (2) the federal interest in applying uniform rules to the issue in question.”
Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev.
527, 559, 563-64 (2003). My proposal extends this linkage to all Erie cases.
71
Like both Byrd balancing and the ad hoc accommodation of state and federal interests by
the Gasperini majority and the Shady Grove dissent, this expansion of judicial discretion
has been criticized. See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the
Federal Rules: As Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 Va. L. Rev.
707 (2006); C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 1997 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 267; Hendricks, supra note ___.
72
Some scholars have suggested that preclusion law should be considered substantive. See
Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev.
585, 609-14, 638-44 (2006). Perhaps it should, in the end. But the whole point of the postErie cases I have been discussing is that the Court has interpreted “arguably procedural” to
include anything that is not unarguably substantive; “arguably procedural” thus includes
essentially everything other than core issues of standards of liability, elements of a cause of
action, and related concepts that govern outside-the-courtroom activities.
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question cases, the courts are free to fashion any federal common-law
preclusion doctrines they like, while in diversity cases they avoid any clash
between federal preclusion law and state substantive policies by
“borrowing” state preclusion law. And if a case arises in which the Court
thinks that some federal interest – akin to the interest in the transsubstantive
application of the Federal Rules – should trump state preclusion law, the
Court will say so directly rather than insisting that it is the procedural nature
of the federal interest that requires application of federal law.73
Notice, however, that this result is accomplished only by pretending
that the Erie doctrine does not exist. Perhaps we should take that as a hint
that the Erie doctrine should not exist. In other words, while most of the
recent Erie cases illustrate the unavoidable internal conflict within the Erie
doctrine, Semtek instead shows us an alternative to Erie that provides a way
out of the dilemma. It is to that alternative that I now turn.
IV. THE ONLY VIABLE SOLUTION
The inescapable internal tension between the two rationales of the
Erie doctrine has produced an unpredictable and inconsistent set of
precedents as the Court (and sometimes an individual Justice) vacillates
between one rationale and the other without recognizing the underlying
dilemma. We could solve the problem by getting rid of diversity
jurisdiction, which would eliminate the need for any kind of Erie doctrine.74
We could also solve it by repealing the Rules Enabling Act and resurrecting
the Conformity Act, which directed federal courts to apply state procedural

73

That Semtek in fact allows the Court to sidestep Erie is illustrated by a comparison
between two scholars: Professor Stephen Burbank argues that Semtek adopted his view that
state law should govern the preclusive effect of federal-court judgments in diversity cases
because of “the limitations the Enabling Act places on the Court’s power” over preclusion
law, and Professor Patrick Woolley argues that it stands for the proposition that “neither
the Erie policy nor the REA prevents recognition of the very strong federal interest in
uniform federal rules of preclusion.” Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping and
Federal Common Law, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1027, 1055 (2002); Woolley, supra note
___, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 529.
74
Maybe. State-law questions might still arise under supplemental jurisdiction, see 28
U.S.C. § 1367, and in cases in which a federal-law question is embedded in a state cause of
action, see Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg, 545 U.S. 308
(2005).
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rules in diversity cases. Neither of those options seems realistic.75 The
remaining solution is to eliminate the source of the problem by eliminating
the Erie doctrine and substituting a different and more coherent way to
accommodate state substantive policies with the demands of a separate and
independent federal judicial system.
What would the world look like without Erie? In 1938, perhaps, it
had to look like Swift. But seventy-five years later, there is no particular
reason to return to Swift’s illusory distinction between local and general law
or its invocation of a naturalist and anti-positivist jurisprudence.76 Instead,
we can take a cue from Semtek and look at whether federal interests trump
state policy choices in the particular circumstances. If federal interests
should prevail, federal law applies; if there is no pressing federal interest,
the default option is to apply state law – not as a matter of constitutional
command, but for the practical reasons recognized by the Court in both Erie
and Semtek.77
In short, perhaps a Semtek-inspired “new Erie” doctrine should look
like implied preemption of the “purposes-and-objectives” type:78 A
75

Although there is a lot to be said for eliminating diversity jurisdiction. See Suzanna
Sherry, Against Diversity, 17 Constit. Commentary 1 (2000); Larry Kramer, Diversity
Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 97.
76
Jack Goldsmith and Steven Walt make a good case that Erie’s commitment to legal
positivism is irrelevant to its holding. Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the
Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 Va. L. Rev. 673 (1998); see also Steven Walt, Before
the Jurisprudential Turn: Corbin and the Mid-Century Opposition to Erie, 2 Wash. U.
Jurisprudence Rev. 75 (2010).
77
One scholar defends a similar presumption in favor of state law as constitutionally
required on the ground that “a judicially created federal rule that imposes or overrides
substantive rights requires a justification other than the mere authority to assert federal
court jurisdiction or to regulate federal procedure.” Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie
Doctrine? (And What Does it Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?,
84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 245, 319 (2008). Steinman makes this argument in the context of
defending simultaneously the prescriptions of the Erie doctrine (in all its complexity) and
the existence of enclaves of federal common law that trump state law. He thus uses an
argument about federal interests to limit federal judicial power, while I use it to expand
federal judicial power.
78
As the Supreme Court has explained, even in the absence of an express preemption
provision in a federal statute, a state law is impliedly preempted when it “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishments and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Accord, Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
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presumption that state-law policy choices govern in diversity cases unless
there is reason to believe that applying state law would interfere with some
important federal interest or objective. Similarly, a focus on the state law’s
effect on federal interests would mirror current doctrine under the dormant
Commerce Clause, which also allows uncodified federal interests to
overcome state regulation.79 Ironically, patterning the new Erie doctrine
after implied preemption should be less controversial than the implied
preemption doctrine itself.80 Under implied preemption, the Court relies on
federal interests to determine what happens in state court: a state-law claim
that is preempted cannot be brought in either state or federal court. Under
my proposal, the Court uses federal interests to determine only what
happens in federal court, a much more justifiable result.81
And despite its novelty, my proposal draws on existing doctrine.
Semtek is not alone in its insistence that sometimes federal common law
displaces state law notwithstanding Erie. First, the Court has applied federal
common law that is inconsistent with state law when it finds that the
differences between the two are not likely to produce forum-shopping or
inequities.82

___, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 373 (2000); Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000).
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See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
80
For criticism of implied preemption see, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Preemption War
265 (2008); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225 (2000); Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 587-89 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
81
Under the current Erie doctrine, state courts are not bound to follow what are frequently
called “Erie guesses” by federal courts (including the Supreme Court) interpreting state
law. Even under Swift, state courts did not consider themselves bound to follow the
common law decisions of the Supreme Court. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R.
Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 77 (2009) (“Neither
federal nor state courts considered the other’s decisions on questions of general law to be
binding in subsequent cases”); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 1513, 1561 (1984) (citing Waln v. Thompson, 9 Serg. & Rawle 115, 122 (Pa. 1822));
also Stalker v. M’Donald, 6 Hill 93 (NY Sup. Ct. 1843) (declining to follow the substantive
holding of Swift).
82
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 51-54 (1991). The Court in Walker hinted at
this possibility by resorting to the “twin aims” analysis after finding no directly controlling
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. See note ___, supra.
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More broadly, the Court has consistently held – beginning with a
case decided on the same day as Erie83 – that federal common law governs,
even in diversity cases, if the suit implicates “uniquely federal interests.”84
State law is displaced whenever there exists “a significant conflict between
some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.”85 To date, the
Court has endorsed this use of federal common law in only six limited
“enclaves,”86 and scholars have defended these enclaves largely on
historical or structural grounds.87 My proposal generalizes from these
limited enclaves to create a broader concept of conflict preemption: Courts
may create and apply federal common law whenever doing so is necessary
to protect federal interests that would be frustrated by the application of
state law.
The primary difference between my proposal and the existing
doctrines authorizing the use of federal common law, then, lies in its level
of generality. Rather than creating narrow categories of federal enclaves and
adding categories piecemeal by analogy, I suggest a new overarching
standard to govern the displacement of state law. Replacing the Court’s
current categorical approach with a generalized standard has all the usual
advantages of such a move, and is all the more beneficial in a jurisprudence
as beset with problems and inconsistencies as the Erie doctrine is.88
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Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988); Texas Industries, Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
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Wallis v. Pan Am Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
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The term “enclaves” is widely used. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
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Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) and identified the six accepted enclaves. Tidmarsh &
Murray, supra note ___, at 588 & n.16.
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See, e.g., Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note ___; Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common
Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245 (1996).
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My theory has the additional benefit of harmonizing the federal courts’ authority to make
common law with their authority in diversity cases; as many scholars have noted, there is a
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“[T]he statutory, policy, and constitutional rationales of Erie are in tension with the
continued existence of federal common law. . . . If federal (and state) courts have broad
powers to make federal common law, then the power refused to federal courts in Erie pales
in comparison to the power retained by federal (and state) courts to establish federal rules
of decision.” Tidmarsh & Murray at 586-87.
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The final advantage of my proposal is that it eliminates the two
unjustified dichotomies I mentioned earlier. It makes federal judicial power
congruent with federal legislative power, and it treats all federal interests as
potentially subject to judicial protection regardless of whether those
interests fall into particular identifiable categories. Ironically, expanding
federal judicial power in this way can itself be seen as mandated by one of
Erie’s most basic moves. In overruling Swift, the Erie court dictated that
state legislative and judicial lawmaking be treated identically. But current
doctrine does not accord the same courtesy to federal judicial lawmaking;
my proposal would align state and federal judicial (vis-a-vis legislative)
power.89

V. CONSEQUENCES
I turn finally to the consequences of adopting my new proposal. In
many run-of-the-mill Erie cases – such as an auto accident between citizens
of different states – the new Erie doctrine probably would not differ much
from the old one. As long as there is no federal interest in a uniform federal
auto-accident tort law, state law will apply to those cases by default.90
But replacing the Erie doctrine with a preemption approach would
produce very different results in two particular types of cases. First, there
are the cases that form the heart of this essay, in which the old Erie doctrine
issues conflicting commands. Under my proposal, the Court would instead
have to decide explicitly whether the federal interest in uniform,
transsubstantive procedural rules for federal courts is more important than
89

My proposal also eliminates a further distinction between state and federal court
obligations. Currently, state courts are not bound under Erie to apply the law of a sister
state to disputes arising in that sister state, and even when they do apply another state’s law
they often presume – sometimes almost irrebuttably – that the other state’s law mirrors
their own. See Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Foreign
Law, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1237 (2011) (documenting lack of Erie obligation on state courts
and arguing that Erie should bind state courts as well as federal courts).
90
It is possible that a persuasive case can be made for a strong federal interest in uniform
auto-accident tort law. In one sense, every accident is local and unique, and thus there is no
reason not to apply state law. On the other hand, one might argue that factors such as the
interstate highway system and the increased mobility of the population suggest the need for
uniformity. As I will argue shortly, products-liability law necessarily affects federal
interests; whether general tort law does so is an open question.
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allowing states to make substantive policy choices. If it is, then the Federal
Rules will always prevail, even over a state law intended to operate
substantively. That answer supports the Shady Grove plurality, the
Gasperini dissent, and the unanimous Stewart and Burlington Northern
cases; it undermines the Shady Grove concurrence and dissent, the majority
in Gasperini, and the Walker and West combination. (Determining that
uniformity and transsubstantivity are not sufficiently important to trump
state policy choices produces the opposite results.) Whether a federal
interest in uniformity and transsubstantivity should be considered important
enough to override state substantive law is a separate question, which I do
not address here.91
The key point is not how these cases should come out but rather that
the Court would be deciding them transparently and in the name of an
overriding federal interest, rather than denying the existence of a conflict or
pretending that the result turned on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.92 In one sense, then, adopting a Semtek-like preemption
approach in these cases takes a jurisprudential dispute that is currently being
fought underground (or through proxies) and moves it into daylight where it
can be addressed directly. The cases would also be more predictable: Either
the interest in uniformity or transsubstantivity is sufficient to overcome any
91
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state policy choice, or it is not. The case-by-case approach that has led to
the confusing vacillation would disappear under my approach. The current
doctrine is incoherent; my proposal at least yields coherence.93 It is difficult
to see why anyone would oppose a change with such salutary effects, except
perhaps out of nostalgia, a misplaced allegiance to the purported
constitutional basis for Erie,94 or a visceral dislike of any doctrine that
openly admits that judges actually exercise – and should exercise –
discretion.
One further question about conflicts between state substantive law
and Federal Rules remains to be discussed. Is the weighting of federal
uniformity a one-time decision applicable across the board to all Federal
Rules and all state laws, or does it depend on either the particular state
interest or the particular Federal Rule?
As to variations in state laws, anything short of an all-or-nothing
decision is simply a return to the current regime, albeit on a more
transparent basis. There is little predictability in a jurisprudence that lets
judges weigh each individual state interest against a federal interest in
uniformity, and allows different conclusions with regard to different state
policies. In this, my proposal is unlike the analysis under preemption or
dormant Commerce Clause doctrines, which depend on the actual threat that
the particular state law poses to implementation of the federal interest. The
reason for the difference lies in the different nature of the federal interest in
the Erie procedural cases: Unlike an interest in particular federal policies
(as in preemption) or free-flowing interstate commerce (as in the dormant
Commerce Clause) an interest in uniformity is always necessarily
93
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undermined by allowing it to vary depending on the interests arrayed
against it.95
I am more agnostic about whether the interest in uniformity and
transsubstantivity might vary across different Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is certainly possible that uniformity might be more important
for some Rules than for others, and thus the Court might conclude that some
Rules apply regardless of their impact on state substantive choices and
others do not. Such an approach sacrifices some predictability but still
retains the core idea of transparently analyzing the conflict as one between
enabling state policy decisions and fostering the underlying goals of the
Federal Rules.
The second type of case affected by my suggestion is likely to
generate considerably more controversy, both because it is of more practical
consequence and because it is further afield from the core question (Erie in
the procedural context) of this essay. For those reasons, I sketch my
arguments only briefly; I hope to develop them further in a later article.
In our national (or global) consumer economy, much corporate
activity is what Sam Issacharoff has labeled national market activity:
“conduct that arises from mass produced goods entering the stream of
commerce with no preset purchaser or destination.”96 If the goods are
defective or cause injury, the effect is felt nationwide but liability is
imposed state by state under potentially different substantive laws and
policies. Those laws and policies, in turn, offer different protections for
consumers in different states and also necessarily affect the incentives of
corporations in their design and manufacturing of products. One state’s law
has the capacity to drive national standards; different state requirements
might impose conflicting obligations on manufacturers; and consumers in
some state may suffer uncompensated damage for which consumers in other
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states are compensated.97 Particularly with regard to defendants, then, the
substantive products-liability law of any given state has nationwide
implications and effects. In short, substantive state policy judgments have
the potential to wreak havoc on our national economy.98 Regardless of
whether Congress chooses to federalize products-liability law,99 there is
thus a strong federal interest in uniform liability rules for corporations
whose products are distributed indiscriminately to consumers in every state.
On my theory, that interest is enough to override individual state policy
choices and require federal courts to develop and apply a federal common
law of products liability in diversity cases.
Using federal law to protect a national economy has a historical
pedigree that predates even Swift v. Tyson. In 1821, Chief Justice Marshall
equated the federal interest in national commerce with the federal interest in
foreign affairs: “That the United States form, for many, and for most
important purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are
one people. In making peace, we are one people. In all commercial
regulations, we are one and the same people.”100 This sentiment accords
with the generally accepted basis of diversity jurisdiction as protecting
national commercial interests from parochial state laws.101
The consequences of a replacing state substantive law with a federal
common law of products liability are twofold. First, nationwide class
actions under Rule 23, currently rarely certified, would become viable. As
97
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Judge Richard Posner has pointed out in denying certification to a
nationwide class, “[t]he voices of the quasi-sovereigns that are the states of
the United States sing negligence with a different pitch.”102 Those different
tunes mean that the same law will not apply to all members of a nationwide
class of consumers, and thus certification is inappropriate for many – if not
most – nationwide classes. My proposal, by requiring the application of
federal common law to these national-market claims, makes the different
tunes irrelevant and allows certification of a nationwide class. The flip side,
however, is that once a nationwide class is certified in federal court (or even
if individual suits are brought in federal court), federal, not state, law would
determine liability. And because federal jurisdictional statutes require only
minimal diversity in large class actions,103 plaintiffs who prefer to stay in
state court to take advantage of state law would be able to do so only if they
limited the class to consumers in one state. Both consumers and
corporations would benefit: consumers would be able to consolidate their
claims into a nationwide class action and would all receive the same levels
of protection and compensation, and corporations would be protected from
the idiosyncrasies of particular states and the potential for conflicting
standards of liability.
***
By citing (but not directly relying on) Erie and its progeny in
Semtek, the Court showed us the way to bring back together two ideas that
have been separated for 75 years. Federal court power to shape substantive
law is intertwined with and depends on the existence of federal interests
sufficient to overcome the limits on federal lawmaking and the premise of
residual state power. Those federal interests exist regardless of whether they
have been codified by Congress. But Erie sheared off some of those federal
interests and insisted that they could not be protected in the absence of
congressional codification. The Erie doctrine and the development of
enclaves of federal common law are, at one level, a history of attempts to
figure out which federal interests require codification as a prerequisite to
judicial protection and which do not. My proposal, inspired by Semtek, is to
unify the two inquiries with a transparent standard that asks directly
whether there exists a sufficient federal interest to demand the application
of federal rather than state law.
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CONCLUSION
The Erie doctrine is a mess. Every time the Court wades into it, it
gets worse. The Court’s failure to save Erie should not be surprising: The
underlying problem is that the doctrine itself is internally incoherent. The
only solution is to scrap Erie and replace it with a more coherent vision of
the role of federal courts in a regime of dual sovereigns. And the role of
federal courts should be the same as the role of the federal government in
general: protecting national interests from individual state policy choices
detrimental to the nation as a whole. Seventy-five years ago, when Erie
limited the role of federal courts, the federal government was barely
beginning to exercise its authority. Isn’t it time that the federal courts catch
up with the massive expansion of the rest of federal power?
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